German Expellees in the Anglo-American Press, 1944-1950

On February 9, 1945 Margarete Marquardt was loaded onto a cattle car and expelled from her home in East Prussia:

“[W]e . . . were set on the march eastward.  Then we were loaded into cattle cars.  The cars remained closed for five days, nailed shut and totally black inside.  During the whole trip, which lasted 29 days we were let out at just one stop, where we were allowed to drink our fill of water at a lake.  At that time 32 people out of 100 were already dead.  When we arrived we were blinded by the sudden light from the opened door.  It was difficult to walk because our legs were stiff and numb from squatting for so long.”[1]

Marquardt and 13 million other Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) were expelled from the German territories of Silesia, Prussia, Posen, Pomerania, and East Brandenburg which were ceded to Poland at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945.  The agreement at Potsdam also permitted the new Czechoslovakian government to expel the ethnic Germans of Bohemia and the Sudetenland – areas inhabited by ethnic Germans since the 13th century when Otakar II of Bohemia promoted the settlement of skilled German laborers.[2]  The Allies legitimized the expulsion of the ethnic Germans from these territories to appease the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations’ antipathy towards Germans after the Second World War.  This hostility directed at the ethnic German minorities resulted from Adolf Hitler’s expansionist policies and the brutal fighting on the Eastern Front.  Through Hitler’s expansionist policies, the Nazi regime expanded the Reich to incorporate all ethnic Germans and their territories believing that all Germans belonged to Germany, ignoring the fact that these Germans were socially and culturally different from those in the Altreich, while Slavic lands would provide the Reich with labor and food.  The Nazi regime’s expansion eastward enhanced the ethnic Germans position, power, and status over ethnically “inferior” races leading many to capitalize on Hitler’s racial policies by confiscating possessions and land belonging to Poles, Czechs, Russians, and Jews.  However, with the retreat of the Wehrmacht and the western advance of the Red Army in 1945, this privileged position evaporated and initiated the flight the Volksdeutsche westward to escape the vengeance of the Soviets.  While many fled, others remained only to be ravished by the Red Army and later expelled from their homes by Allied agreements.

The legalization of the ethnic German expulsions by the three major Allies, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, greatly affected the European landscape and significantly contributed to the population shifts after the Second World War.  While Europeans and occupying soldiers faced the consequences of the expulsions every day, the awareness of American and British citizens of the ethnic German expulsion and remains unknown.  In order to clarify the awareness and the depiction of the expulsions to an Anglo-American audience, this essay will examine the Anglo-American press’ portrayal the German expellees from 1944 – 1950.  It will describe how Nazi policies, Allied agreements, and ethnic racism contributed to the brutal and often inhumane treatment in relocating expellees.  Furthermore, the expellee experience helps to explain how and why ethnic cleansing became a legitimized and desired precedent and emphasizes the broader historical trend of ethnic homogenization in postwar Europe.  My research on the Anglo-American press reveals that the German expellees were viewed as a social, political, and economic problem.  In fact, while the expellees, like the German population in general, saw themselves as victims, the Anglo-American press framed the expellees as a hindrance to recovery and not as a civilian population recently removed from their homes.  In this essay, I argue that the Anglo-American press did not characterize the expellees as victims but as a logistical, political, and economic problem in need of a quick solution for German and European recovery.

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The ultimate decision for the expulsion of the ethnic Germans can be traced to the three Allied conferences at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam where the Allies debated the postwar world.  The first meeting in Tehran occurred from November 28 – December 1, 1943 following vicious fighting on the Eastern Front and the Anglo-American invasion of Italy.  Meeting in Tehran for the first time, the Allied leaders, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill, were already prepared to defend spheres of influence in war torn Europe.  The Anglo-American delegation refused Soviet involvement in occupied Italy angering Stalin, and in turn, he sought to keep Anglo-Americans from Eastern Europe.  These developing tensions played an important role in the discussions that arose on postwar plans for Poland.  During Tehran two Polish governments in exile existed, the first in London worked with the British, and the other, in Lublin, Poland, remained under Stalin’s influence.  While Churchill encouraged the Soviets to work with both groups, Stalin broke off communication with the London Poles in 1943 after they accused the Soviets for the KatynForest massacre.  This formulated excuse allowed Stalin to disavow the London Poles and develop his own postwar plans including the shift of Poland’s borders west to the Oder and Neisse Rivers at the expense of Germany.  In a private conversation between Churchill and Stalin, Churchill indicated that the British were open towards a revision of Poland’s borders and, using matchsticks, demonstrated his idea for moving Poland westward pleasing Stalin.[3]  Overall, the Tehran Conference played a significant role in furthering the Allied war effort.  The discussions there yielded plans to open a second front and an agreement for the creation of a United Nations organization; however, it also revealed Churchill’s desire to maintain British influence in the Mediterranean at the expense of Eastern Europe. [4]  A motive that later manifested itself in the infamous percentages agreement between Churchill and Stalin.

The Big Three next met at the Crimean city of Yalta in February of 1945 where Allied discussions focused on the occupation of Germany, the dismemberment of German lands, deindustrialization of Germany, and the Soviets entering the Asian Theater.[5]   The Soviets, holding a strong military position in Eastern Europe, presented a peace proposal that included plans for the westward shift of Poland.  This proposal resulted in disagreements between the Allies. While Churchill agreed to Soviet influence in Poland, he wanted Stalin to include the London Poles in the discussion which Stalin blatantly refused and Roosevelt worried over the reaction millions of Polish voters in the United States; furthermore, both desired free elections in postwar Poland.  These excuses infuriated Stalin whose sole focus remained Soviet expansion and security.   After four invasions since 1914, Stalin demanded influence and Soviet friendly governments in neighboring nations in order to safely rebuild the war torn Soviet Union and he would only recognize the communist Polish government.[6]  With tensions high, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin eventually agreed to shaky terms that included free elections and a broadly based government in Poland, but the Anglo-Americans delayed a final peace settlement in the hopes of increasing military capacity and improving strategic locations in Europe and Asia before signing a final settlement.[7]  However, with the failure of the Warsaw Uprising and the Soviet occupation of Poland at the war’s conclusion, Stalin still held the strategic advantage when the Allies met to negotiate the final peace settlement at Potsdam.[8]

The last Big Three conference met in Potsdam from July to August 1945 and included two new leaders – Harry Truman who succeeded Roosevelt after his death in April and Clemet Attlee whose Labour Party defeated Winston Churchill in the 1945 elections.  Potsdam exclusively focused on the problem of postwar Germany and revolved around the clashing ideas of Truman and Stalin.  In fact, several historians view the Potsdam conference and the tensions that arose there as marking the start of the Cold War.[9]  During the negotiations, Truman opposed the distribution of German territory to compensate Poland but the superior Soviet military position left Truman only two options: a united Germany under the control of occupying powers or a divided Germany with Soviet influence in a limited area.  Truman chose the latter option.[10]  The Potsdam Agreement, ratified by all three nations, concurred on three decisions for Germany: the principals to govern the defeated Germany; the extension of Soviet and Polish borders at Germany’s expense; and the expulsion of the German populations from Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.  The ethnic Germans, without legal or physical protection, under the guard of vengeful nations gathered the remnants of their lives and migrated to an unfamiliar country struggling to rebuild itself from the desolations of war.

The expulsion of the ethnic Germans has three phases which G.C. Paikert labels: the Soviet phase, the phase of national retribution, and the phase of legalization.[11]  The first phase took place in 1945 when the Red Army forced the Wehrmacht out of Poland and the eastern German territories.  The Red Army inspired fear in the ethnic Germans and millions fled in front of the advancing troops hoping to avoid retaliation, yet others stayed behind facing the vicious ravages of the Red Army.[12]  The majority of those fleeing consisted of women, children, and elderly men who had little time to gather their belongings and faced countless troubles securing passage west.  Those who stayed were degraded by the Red Army.  When the Soviet soldiers arrived at Maria Neumann’s farm in Pomerania, she and her family were brutalized.  She and her sister were raped several times before the Soviets hung her husband and sister and strangled her nieces.  Neumann became a prisoner with many other German women who were systematically raped and abused by the Red Army.  Fortunately, Neumann later secured a position as a Russian General’s seamstress and he eventually helped her escape to Berlin.[13]  The rape of German women by the Red Army on the Eastern front, estimated between tens of thousands and two million, falls into expellee and German experience and identification as victims as rape later became a metaphor for German victimization.[14] The Germans that fled during the war were fully exposed to the horrors of war.  They crossed battlefields, observed the bombing of cities in which they tried to take refuge, and suffered from hunger, cold, and disease.[15]

The second phase involved the malicious policies enforced by the reestablished Polish and Czechoslovakian governments.  These two nations suffered heavily at the hands of the Nazi war machine and, after the war’s conclusion, took retribution by removing all the German minorities from their countries.  The ethnic Germans expelled during this phase faced abuse at the hands of the Red Army and the anger of vengeful nationals.  The Czechoslovakian government in exile under Eduard Beneš proclaimed the Decrees of the President of the Republic, known as the Beneš Decrees, which allowed the Czech citizens to seize any German assets for themselves. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, locals gathered up the ethnic Germans with little notice and forced them into Germany, most leaving their belongings behind.  This calamity happened to E. Wollmann of Bohemia.  He and his wife were awoken at 11:00 p.m. and told to vacate their home and be at the train station at 2:00 a.m. for deportation.  Due to a miscommunication between the Czechs and Russians, he and his wife were permitted a few more hours but they eventually left their entire lives behind.  At the train station valuable items, documents, and clothes were all confiscated by Czech soldiers.  They were finally transported to Görlitz in cattle cars plastered with the slogans “Home to the Reich” and “Heil Hitler.”[16]

The third phase of the expulsion involved the United States and Britain who, after signing the Potsdam agreement, took on the responsibility of transferring the ethnic German population, “in an orderly and humane manner.”[17]  This last phase created numerous problems for the Anglo-Americans and the German people.  The Allies constantly berated the Czechs and Poles for their ill treatment of the expellees and for sending only women, children, and the elderly after stripping them of their goods.  Franz Kubin, an expellee from Czechoslovakia, was interned at the Pilsen-Karlov camp and while there witnessed the Czech commandant and guards repeatedly beat expellees until the Americas arrived to oversee the expulsion.  Kubin observed an American soldier punch the Czech commandant for mistreating an expellee woman and ultimately removing the commandant and the Czech guards from the camp.  The Americans then helped the expellee women and elderly onto transports supplying them with bread and meat even giving the children chocolate.[18]

Upon the arrival of expellee transports in worn torn Germany, the expellees were forced to share homes, food, and jobs with native Germans who viewed expellees as foreigners and a source of economic burden.  Scholars have previously examined the social, economic, and political integration of the expellees into the western zones of occupation, and the significant problems this population influx created.[19]  The fundamental problem with Allied integration policy was the location food and shelter.  The famine of 1946 forced the Allies to ration food permitting the Germans population only 900-1400 calories a day, furthermore, research reveals that the wartime devastation reduced the harvest of 1946 fifteen percent from 1945 which was needed to feed a German population inflated with millions of refugees.[20]  Not only were the Germans and the expellees starving but the location of shelter also proved immensely difficult as the Allied bombing campaigns had destroyed numerous cities.  Forced to subsist in rural locations, the expellees lived in the overcrowded homes of Germans and worked agricultural jobs that many believed were beneath them.  This tension resulted in caustic relations between the local Germans and the expellees.

Economically, the expellees faced the same problems as the German population particularly the failure of original Allied reconstruction plans.  The initial Allied economic plan for Germany entitled the Morgenthau Plan called for the pastoralization of Germany in order prevent future wars, however, escalation of Cold War tensions proved to the United States and Great Britain that the western zones needed a robust economy not only to prevent Soviet expansion and communist agitation but also to rebuild Europe’s economic engine.  With this decision made, the United States, against the protest of both France and the Soviet Union, extended Marshall Plan aid to West Germany in 1947 and a year later the West German government implemented the currency reform (Währungsreform) which some scholars view as the beginning of the Economic Miracle (Wirtschaftswunder).[21]   Yet, neither the Marshall Plan nor the currency reform immediately improved the expellees’ situation, and research shows that initially the currency reform negatively affected the German refugees and expellees.[22]  The currency reform resulted in inflation that increased the prices of apartment leases and food which further deteriorated the already weak economic position of the expellees.[23]

These social and economic dilemmas caused the expellees to create organizations to support one another, and as Pertti Ahonen shows, these original support organizations evolved into political groups which the Allies promptly prohibited fearing political radicalization.[24]  Though banned politically, the expellees organizations produced a large demographic and became an important vote that demanded political recognition.  Their sheer size and highly organized networks made it impossible for politicians to avoid them and they used these networks to lobby the West German Parliament on many subjects including refusal to recognize Poland’s western border.  Konrad Adenauer and the CDU took particular interest in winning the expellee vote by devising ways to ease integration and keep in close contact with expellee organizations; however, politically Adenauer and the CDU remained devoted to Western integration not German reunification with the borders of 1937, a clear goal of the expellees.[25]

In recent years historians have investigated the fate, hardships, and politics of the expellees; however, it remains unclear if the Anglo-American citizenry understood the plight of the expellees.  The press’ reporting on the expellees focused heavily on the logistical aspects of the expulsion.  Newspaper articles analyzed how many Germans were shipped, from what area, and which nation was in charge of overseeing the transportation.  Only those involved in the occupying forces completely understood the magnitude of the expellees’ situation.  General Lucius Clay, the American military governor, said “Little has been written of this problem (expellees), which is a continuing major threat to stability in Germany and in central Europe.”[26]  In Great Britain, publisher Victor Gollancz, after seeing Germany’s plight first hand, created an assembly called Save Europe Now (SEN).[27]  This group lobbied the British Parliament to ship more basic food stuffs to Germany but Prime Minister Attlee and his advisors blamed the situation on Russia’s refusal to send grain from East Germany.[28]  Even with these men trying to bring the expellees situation to the forefront, most journalists continued examining the transportation and political implications of the expellees and ignored physical and emotional burden of the expulsions.

Following Paikert’s research discussed above, I have divided the Anglo- American media’s articles on the ethnic German expulsion into three separate periods.  The first period examines the year 1945 when the press described all Germans moving from the east into Germany as “refugees” disregarding place of origin.  With the war unresolved, the German people during 1945 remained classified as enemies and any discrimination against German civilians and refugees remained justified.  During the second period, from 1946-1947, the press viewed the expellees as a problem that needed a prompt solution and focused on expellee unemployment, food, housing, and transportation from the east.  By 1946, with the world moving towards an east west divide, the Anglo-American press realized that Germany needed to be a unified nation with a robust economy to prevent Soviet expansion.  The third period, from 1948-1950, observed continued expellee unemployment, the rise in expellee political power, and the economic reforms aimed at expellee integration.  During this period, the press discussed the emerging benefits of the currency reform and Marshall Plan but overlooked how these reforms affected the expellees.  In 1949, Germany held its first election since the war’s conclusion, and the expellees demonstrated the power of their vote by winning forty percent of the vote and fifteen seats in Schleswig-Holstein.  The media illustrated Bonn’s fright from the number of expellee seats won in local governments and proceeded to raise awareness of the expellee struggle forcing Bonn to seriously respond to the expellee plight.


As the Red Army swept across Poland in late 1944 and 1945, ethnic Germans communities fled west fearing the violent and vengeful Soviet soldiers.  During this time, the Anglo-American press categorized all Germans as enemies, warmongers, and murderers.  The German people were collectively guilty for the war a factor that Tony Judt argues is one of the most salient features of postwar Europe.[29]  Thus, with all Germans collectively guilty, the predicament of the ethnic Germans was not seen as a humanitarian crisis, but rather an effect of the German people’s actions.  The Chicago Daily Tribune stated:

Hordes of German refugees streamed out of Poland and eastern Germany today . . . The refugees – women, children and aged – swarmed the roads of eastern Germany . . . Many of them came from the “Lebensraum” Hitler stole from Poland, some out of the menaced eastern provinces of Germany.[30]

In this excerpt, the press identified German refugees fleeing westward to avoid the onslaught of the Red Army, but it also displays the press’ inability to differentiate between those Germans who colonized the east and those who lived there for centuries.  This is a critical distinction.  While ethnic Germans benefited from Nazi policy, they were not recent colonizers of Eastern Europe or “Lebensraum Germans.”  The press’ attempt to categorize all Germans fleeing from the Soviets as part of Hitler’s Lebensraum policy is wildly inaccurate as only 2.5 million Germans moved from the Reich to the occupied territories.[31]  This classification as “Lebensraum Germans” stigmatized all Germans fleeing westward as benefactors of Nazi policy, when in reality the “Lebensraum Germans” only accounted for one sixth of the German population that fled the westward.  The press’ failure to realize the distinction between those Germans who were Nazi colonizers and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe reveals not only the media’s ignorance of European history but also the belief that all Germans were Nazis regardless of origin.

Once the war finally concluded, the press acknowledged the expulsions of the ethnic Germans from Poland.

In Poland, expulsions have gone on both from the former Polish territory seized by Hitler and settled by the Volksdeutche and from German territory placed under Polish administration at the Potsdam Conference.  The difficulty in preventing Poles from returning to their homes in what was always Polish territory and from kicking out the invaders is recognized – and the justness of their action is not questioned. [32]

Although this article recognized German expulsion it makes two false statements.  First, the press categorized the Volksdeutche as colonizers when in reality the Volksdeutche were the ethnic Germans who lived in Eastern Europe for hundreds of years.  They were not the colonizers of Nazi policy.  Second, the article states that the territory placed under Polish administration after the Potsdam Conference was always Polish, when in fact much of the territory discussed belonged to prewar Germany and Prussia prior to 1871.  Although the argument can be made that Fredrick the Great conquered this territory and encouraged German “colonialization,” the territories along the German-Polish border were historically composed of both Germans and Poles.  This mistake can be attributed to a lack of research, but the phrase “the justness of their actions is not questioned” presents the opinion that forcibly removing Germans from Eastern European was a righteous act – forcibly removing the German “colonizers” is the correct moral action.  This article presents the situation as black and white; all Germans must be removed from Eastern Europe in order to prevent future German wars of expansion.  The press makes no attempt to understand the ethnic German situation and clearly reveals that the press still viewed the German people as enemies in late 1945, five months after the war’s conclusion.

The scope and scale of the war created millions of refugees of all nationalities, but their plight was laid at the feet of the Germans by the Anglo-American press.  In describing the displaced persons and inhumane conditions the press asked, “Who do you suppose is going to feed and house these Poles, Russians, Yugoslavs . . . and other liberated slaves suddenly thrown into our lap? The first guess is right – the Germans.”[33]  The press, along with the Allied governments, held the view that the Germans must pay for their crimes; that those who caused the destruction of Europe would be held responsible.  An article from the New York Times makes this clear, “This is retribution at its best.  These browbeaten people, ground under the Nazi heel, some for almost five years are now getting top priority on German food.”[34]  Furthermore, the press also believed that, “The German refugee question is one that the Germans will have to solve.”[35]  Thus the press proposed that Germans were not only responsible for their own ethnic refugees but all refugees the war created.  This responsibility in the wake of a famine exacerbated the problems in post war Germany leading starvation, homelessness, unemployment and political extremism.


In 1944, the European Advisory Commission, established to study the postwar political problems in Europe and make recommendations to the three Allied governments, stated:

German minorities became the advance guard of National Socialist penetration and the states they helped to deliver to Hitler have a well founded grievance against them.  Their transfer to Germany would probably contribute to the tranquility of the countries concerned.[36]

Notably, the commission falsely suggested that all Germans of Eastern Europe were the advanced guards of the Nazi party, however, its proposition to transfer the German population eventually became reality, and in the years 1946 and 1947 the Anglo-American press observed these transfers.  Articles examining the expulsion of the ethnic Germans focused on logistics, transportation, and the conditions of the ethnic Germans during expulsion.

The London Times reported in January of 1946 that, “about 3,000,000 Sudeten Germans were to have been transferred into the various zones of Germany between December 1 and August 1 next, has already broken down.”[37]  This account and others reported the expellees as statistics.  “Some 180,000 Germans have already left for the British zone in Germany . . . and 1,500,000 more are to be deported.  From now onward 250,000 Germans are expected to leave Poland each month.”[38]  When a group of expellees set out for the U.S. Zone, the British press stated the party consisted of 1,209 people: 295 men, 700 women, and 214 children.[39]  In these articles, the media never raised questions about the morality or legality of the transfers; they only factually reported the number of Germans to be transferred.  The lack of inquiry into why these transfers were undertaken and the bland statistical reporting reveals that the press still observed the German people as warmongers and that the nations of Eastern Europe needed to be free of Germans populations to prevent future territorial expansion.   The population transfers were part of the German people’s punishment for supporting the Nazi party.

Though the press never argued against the transfer of expellees, they reported Anglo-American complaints of inhumane treatment during expulsion.

British Control Commission officials allege that the Polish authorities are sending an unduly high proportion of the very old, sick, and the weak, and that it thus appears that there is being transferred not, as agreed at Potsdam, the whole German minority, but the less useful part of it.[40]

This selection demonstrates that the press reported on the inhumane transfers, and observed that the Polish government was selectively transferring the least productive part of society.  However, this also reveals that the press relied on military reports of the expulsion and never undertook their own investigations into the transfers.  The London Times stated in early 1946 that the U.S. and Czechoslovakia reached an agreement that, “transfers will be carried out under medical supervision.  Each individual will be entitled to 30lb. of food and one week’s rations.”[41]  While this is a positive sign in the transfers, the Wall Street Journal reported that upon the arrival of Sudeten Germans in Bavaria, “a large percentage of the expellees arrived without any baggage whatever, the luckier ones with 50 kilos.”[42]  In these articles, the press exposed both Poland and Czechoslovakia for their ill treatment of the expellees, yet the press never questioned the continuation of the transfers or suggested a stoppage to better the situation.  The press willingly agitated and reported the appalling conditions the German expellees experienced because the Potsdam Agreement specifically stated that transfers must be “orderly and humane,” yet because the Anglo-Americans regarded the expulsion of the ethnic Germans as legal, the press never questioned or protested against the expulsions, only the negative conditions.  Furthermore, this reveals that the Anglo-American press corps refused to question military and government officials’ decision to legitimize population transfers.  The press was to report the facts not question the decisions and judgment of political and military leaders.

In addition to the ill treatment of expellees, the massive influx of humanity into Germany created numerous dilemmas, but the utmost problem affecting expellees was the famine of 1946.  The London Times reported,

Germans in the British occupation zone face drastic food ration cuts which will reduce the civilian diet to less than 500 calories daily, unless immediate help is received from outside.[43]

The food crisis became a momentous problem for the Anglo-Americans and the press reported that General Clay, the American Military governor, was “deeply disturbed” about maintaining the ration levels.[44]  The press realized the food crisis was a desperate situation not only because of starvation, but the possibility that a famine would further deteriorate expellee integration.  Air Marshal Sir William Sholto Douglas, British commander in chief in Germany said,

Without food, the Germans cannot work.  Without work, they cannot produce coal.  Without coal, industry cannot get going again.  Without industry, a reasonable standard of living cannot be achieved.[45]

Without a solution to the food crisis, the situation in Germany deteriorated.  Finding an answer to this catastrophe became the only issue in Anglo-American policies in Germany.

The press reported on a meeting between top British officials in which they tried to solve the crisis.

The great and very much feared food crisis in the British zone of Germany has come and today the British Government leaders buckled down to see what they could do about it. . . It is realized that something must be done to rush more food into the British zone, but one senses here a feeling of helplessness, for Britain does not have the food.[46]

The article blamed many different parties for the crisis including the Allied Control Council for underestimating grain usage and the Germans who, “did not collect food and distribute it properly.”[47]  The press finally reported some relief in June of 1946 that, “A total of 35,500,000 pounds of relief material has been shipped to Germany . . . this figure represented more that $25,000,000 worth of food, clothing and medical supplies.”[48]  Between June 1945 and April 1946 over one million tons of food poured into the British zone, and extra purchases were made to prevent British personnel from drawing on German resources.  This crisis led the Anglo-Americans to form Bizonia in order to pool their common resources; however, this did not alleviate the situation as there were few resources to merge.[49]

In the years after the war, the press also reported on expellee relations with the local Germans and the severe shortage of housing.  These two problems were tied together.    Upon arrival in Germany, the expellees were placed in Displaced Persons (DP) camps or in the homes of the local population because housing was nonexistent.  Supplying shelter to the expellees aggravated the locals and they housed the expellees in cupboards or attics, “one happy family boasted ‘our landlord helped us partition off a good place in the attic.’”[50]  The Wall Street Journal stated,

accommodating them (expellees) in private homes has resulted in considerable harm to health and morals . . . an alarming rise in filth and diseases.  The number of TB cases is growing steadily, having increase three to five fold since 1935.[51]

The article later accounted that the death rate for expellees in Bavaria was higher than the indigenous population.[52]  The press reported the difficulties the Allies faced in locating expellees housing, and the problems that resulted from the housing crisis.  However, the press again avoided criticizing the Anglo-American policy, and remained attached to the idea that the expellees were a “German problem.”

The press also reported on expellee unemployment, and often acknowledged that the only positions available to expellees were agricultural positions.

It has been impossible to place more than a fraction of the expellees in the professions or trades in which they were trained. (A) majority of employed expellees are now engaged in agriculture . . . where as a vocational breakdown of the expellees from Czechoslovakia shows that only 25% engaged in agriculture and forestry in their native lands.[53]

Another article discussed that most of expellee workers were miners or industrial workers, and they were unable to find jobs in Bavaria expect for seasonal jobs as lumberman.[54]  Furthermore, expellees who wanted to start their own business faced incredible barriers.   The expellees were denied credit, faced special legal complexities and the local population fought against threatened competition.[55]  The Ruhr industrial area eventually employed the largest amount of expellees, and North Rhine-Westphalia agreed to build homes for the families that located jobs.[56]


If the press recognized the expellee employment problems by the late 1940s, they only acknowledged how unemployment affected German economic recovery and the political problems it created.

Taken as a group, the refugees generally are a potential source of political danger.  They are homeless and dissatisfied.  Throughout western Germany, save in rare instances, they have encountered resistance from the local populations.[57]

This article continues stating that the expellees perceived the larger political parties as opportunistic and only cared for expellee votes not the social and economic issues facing the expellee demographic.[58]  The political isolation felt be the expellees further prevented and delayed the integration of the expellees into the West German society, and led to political extremism.  Understanding this political situation, the press reported that this problem could lead the expellees to associate with radical politicians.

Without homes, without possessions, often without clothes except for a single suit or dress living in miserable and crowded conditions, either unemployed or employed in work which they have no inclination  . . . They (expellees) might be the first supporters of a new Nazi movement or they might, for all their sufferings turn towards Communism in the hope that a Communist Germany might recover the lost lands by agreement with Russia.[59]

With the onset of the Cold War, the Western Allies feared the expellees’ political radicalization and banned the formation of expellee political parties.  The military government hoped that the expellees would integrate into other established parties; however, with established parties focusing on broader segments of the population, integration failed to occur and the expellees finally created their own party, the Union of Expellees and Disenfranchised (Bund der Heimatvertriebenen, or BHE).  As the elections of 1949 neared, the press continued examining the expellees’ political emergence.

Prior to an election in Schleswig – Holstein the press announced, “the emergence of a new political force in Western Germany . . . represented by 10,000,000 expelled Germans.”[60]   Jobless, homeless, and starving, the press recognized the emerging political power the expellees represented particularly in Schleswig-Holstein were the expellees represented over forty percent of the population.  The press reported that the expellee party demanded, “adequate resettlement, compensation for losses, and the return of Eastern Germany.”[61]  The politicalization of the expellees forced the Anglo-Americans and the German government to acknowledge expellee problems, and finally initiate policies aimed at specifically aiding the expellees.  The election results in Schleswig-Holstein confirmed the Anglo-Americans and the Germans worst fears.

The expellee party of Schleswig-Holstein won forty percent of the vote and gained fifteen seats in the legislature.  The New York Times reported,

The victory . . . may induce the refugees and the discontented throughout the country to form a national movement along the same lines.  That would be an extremely difficult organization with which to cope.  The refugee party appeals to the same type of unhappy post war groups as did the Nazi party in the early Twenties.[62]

By comparing the expellees to Nazis, this article demonstrates the real fear in Germany – that a fascist or communist political organization that pandered to the expellees and disenfranchised peoples would attempt to seize power.  The press and the German government were finally realizing that the expellees were a potentially dangerous group, and without assistance were likely to develop into radical political organization capable of disrupting the new German government.  If the German politicians desired a peaceful democratic government, they now needed to address the expellee concerns.

The large numbers of unemployed expellees and their emerging political power forced the German Government to work on improving the expellee situation.  The London Times reported on a series of proposals developed by Konrad Adenauer and other Ministers.

(1) The spending of 2,500m. D-marks on housing; (2) the granting of more than 200m. D-marks to the railways for projects employing a large amount of labour; (3) the granting of 50m. D-marks to the Post Office for similar projects . . . (6) the granting of additional 300m. D-marks to Bavaria, Lower Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein, which are especially burdened by the inflow of those driven from the east.[63]

In addition, Adenauer wanted the Allied High Commission to raise the level of steel production, to decrease unemployment, and increase exports.  However, the Bonn government faced financial issues in starting this program.  Bonn counted on Allied aid but the Americans believed the Germans should find support within Germany.[64]   The Adenauer government faced early struggles funding their proposals; however, with the Marshall Plan, the currency reform, the Monnet Plan, and the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community the new West German nation began to recover economically.  The economic recovery of Germany slowly improved the expellee situation which would eventually lead to integration.

The Anglo-American press viewed German expellees from Eastern Europe as a problem that needed a solution instead of a humanitarian concern.  The devastation created by the Nazi war machine allowed the press to view ethnic German refugees as enemies of war instead of a people ravished by the Red Army and driven from their homes.  At the conclusion of the war, Allied agreements and military positions created the conditions for the legal expulsion of the ethnic Germans.  The nations of Europe suffered under the Nazi regime, and the Allied governments’ endorsement of the Potsdam Agreement allowed the nations of Europe to legally retaliate by deporting their ethnic German minorities without repercussions.  The press reported the expulsion of the ethnic Germans with similar feelings, and only described the logistical and political consequences of the expulsions.  They reported the number of expellees, their origin, their living conditions, and their employment status, but the press never pursued the hard questions about the legitimacy of the expulsions.   The press and the Anglo-American governments only brought the expellees’ dire situation to the forefront during elections.  Worried about the expellees’ radical politics, the press suddenly began addressing the expellee plight.  This political unrest led to the Equalization of Burdens Act (Lastenausgleichsgestz, or LAG).  Passed in 1952 LAG compensated the expellees for lost property, homes, business and other assets at a ratio of one to ten.  Implemented when unemployment was highest, LAG contributed to the integration of the expellees into West German society as they no longer felt like welfare recipients, but rather participants in the recovering economy.[65]  LAG, along with Marshall Plan aid, improved the expellee economic situation during the Wirtschaftswunder, and the growing economic progress gave the expellees a new national identity.

The Economic Miracle of the 1950s offered all Germans a new national identity.  They ceased to view themselves as expellees or locals, but rather as members of a new prospering democratic republic.  The economic prosperity created great pride in the Germans, and this pride fostered a new collective identity.[66]  The government emphasized this new economic identity, and encouraged expellee participation in the Federal Republic which helped to further integrate the expellees.  Expellee political organizations lost their influence, and the BHE, which tried attracting a broader demographic, became irrelevant with expellee integration.  As Germany recovered and the Cold War accelerated, the original expellee political goals of reclaiming their homelands were seen as dangerously radical.  With the introduction of Ostpolitik, the general public viewed the reclamation of the eastern territories as anarchist.  The shift of the Ministry for Expellees into the Ministry of the Interior by Willy Brandt in 1969 demonstrated the declining influence the expellees as a unique demographic.[67]

The most powerful display of expellee integration came from the expellees themselves.  In August of 1950, the leaders of the expellee organizations presented The Charter of German Expellees (Charta der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen) exactly five years after the declaration of the Potsdam Agreement.  Unlike most special interest groups, the expellee charter was not a list of demands.  It advocated for equal rights, reasonable distribution of burdens, and integration.  The expellee charter was a document for the future, and the Charters’ statements and goals were very similar those of the future European Community.  The expellees declared three principles they supported to create a united Europe:

  1. We, the expellees, renounce all thought of revenge and retaliation. Our resolution is solemn and sacred in memory of the infinite suffering brought upon mankind, particularly during the past decade.
  2. We shall support with all our strength every endeavor directed towards the establishment of a united Europe in which the nations may live in freedom from fear and coercion.
  3. We shall contribute, by hard and untiring work, to the reconstruction of Germany and Europe.[68]

These declarations displayed the expellee population’s renouncement of their radical political objectives and movement towards a united Germany and united Europe.

The expellee charter also recognized that support and care for refugees is the responsibility of all nations.  “The nations must realize that the fate of the German expellees, just as that of all refugees, is a world problem the solution of which calls for the highest moral responsibility and for a commitment to tremendous effort.”[69]  However, the nations of the world have disregarded this statement or delayed taking action until the situation can no longer be ignored.  Ethnic cleansing is still being pursed in the Balkan Peninsula between Serbia and Kosovo, the Darfur region of Africa, and between the Sunni and Shia Islamic denominations.   Although ethnic cleansing is still practiced throughout the world, the press no longer hesitates reporting this terrible practice and raises awareness by bringing these stories to newspapers and the internet daily.

[1] Alfred M. de Zayas, A Terrible Revenge, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 121.

[2] Hugh LeCaine Agnew, The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, StanfordUniversity, 2004), 25.

[3] Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War they Waged and the Peace they Sought, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957), 284.

[4] Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence II, ed. William Kimball, (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1984), 613.

[5] John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement after the Second World War, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1972); Diane Shaver Clemens, Yalta, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1970); Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War they Waged and the Peace they Sought, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957); William McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, (New York, NY: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1970); John L. Snell, Illusion and Necessity, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1963).

[6] US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C., 1955), 668-669.

[7] Snell, 140-141.

[8] For the Warsaw Uprising see Norman Davies, Rising ’44: The Battle for Warsaw, (New York: Viking, 2004).

[9] Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference, (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1960); Charles L. Mee, Meeting at Potsdam, (New York, NY: M. Evans & Company, Inc, 1975); John L. Snell, Wartime origins of the East-West dilemma over Germany, (New Orleans, LA: Hauser Press, 1959); Alfred M. de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, (Boston : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979).

[10] Walter LaFeber, The American Age, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), 445-446.

[11] G.C. Paikert, The German Exodus, (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1962), 7.

[12] de Zayas, A Terrible Revenge, 33-62.

[13] de Zayas, A Terrible Revenge, 50-61.

                [14] Atina Grossmann, Jews, Germans, and Allies, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Elizabeth Heineman, “The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germany’s ‘Crisis Years’ and West German National Identity,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 101, No. 2. (Apr., 1996), pp. 354-395; Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: a history of the Soviet Zone of occupation, 1945-1949, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995) 69-140.

                [15]Paikert, 3.

[16] Theodore Schrieder, The expulsion of the German population from Czechoslovakia; a selection and translation from Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa, Band IV, 1 and IV, 2. (Bonn, Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims, 1960), 462-463.

                [17] Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-1950, ed. Beate Ruhm von Oppen, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1955), 49.

[18] K.O. Kurth, trans. Helen Taubert and Margaret Brooke, Documents of Humanity, (New York, NY:  Harper & Brothers, 1954), 20.

[19] Ian Conner, “German Refugees and the Bonn Government’s Resettlement Programme: The Role of the Trek Association in Schleswig-Holstein, 1951-3,” German History, Vol. 18 No.3. (2000), pp 337-361; Thomas Grosser, “The Integration of Deportees into the Society of the Federal Republic of Germany,” Journal of Communist Studies & Transition Politics, 2000 16(1-2): 125-147; Joanne E. Holler, The German Expellees: A Problem of Integration, (Washington DC: George Washington University, 1963); Julius Isaac, “Problems of Cultural Assimilation Arising from Population Transfers in Western Germany,” Population Studies, Vol. 3, Cultural Assimilation of Immigrants: Supplement. (Mar., 1950), pp. 23-37; G.C. Paikert, The German Exodus, (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1962); David Rock and Stefan Wolff, Coming Home to Germany?, (New York : Berghahn Books, 2002).

[20]Barbara Marshall, “German Attitudes to the British Military Government 1945-47,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 15, No. 4. (Oct., 1980), 659-661.

[21] Robert L Hetzel, “German Monetary History in the First have of the Twentieth Century,” Economic Quarterly, (Richmond), Vol. 88 (2002) pp. 1-35; F. A. Lutz, “The German Currency Reform and the Revival of the German Economy,” Economica, New Series, Vol. 16, No. 62. (May, 1949), pp. 122-142; Walter W. Heller, “Economic Policy in Occupied Germany,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, May, 1950), pp. 531-547.

[22] Ian Turner, ed. Reconstruction in post-war Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945-55. (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1989).

[23] Turner, 324.

[24] Pertti Ahonen, After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945-1990, (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2003).

[25] Konrad Adenauer, trans. Beate Ruhm von Oppen. Memoirs. (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1966), 168, 174, 175, 187; Ahonen, 92-110.

[26]Lucius Clay, Decisions in Germany, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1950), 313.

[27]John Farquhanon, ‘Emotional but Influential’, Journal of Contemporary History (SAGE, London, NewburyPark, Beverly Hills and New Delhi), Vol. 22 (1987), 501-502.

[28] Farquhanon, 502-503.

[29] Tony Judt, Memory and Power in Postwar Europe, ed. Jan-Werner Müller, (Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2002), 160.

                [30] “Nazi Refugees In East Stream Back To Reich.” Chicago Daily Tribune (1923-1963), January 24, 1945, (accessed April 21, 2010).

            [31] “The Demography of War: Germany,” Population Index, Vol. 14, No. 4. (Oct., 1948), 295.

                [32] Sydney Gruson, “Deportations of Germans add to Europe’s Troubles: Allies, Having Taken Care of Millions of ‘Displaced Persons,’ Try to Stop Them.” New York Times (1857-Current file), November 18, 1945, (accessed March 23, 2008).

                [33] Gene Currivan, “Army comes to the Aid of Germany’s Victims: Millions of Refugees and Displaced Persons Are Now Getting Help.” New York Times (1857-Current file), April 22, 1945, (accessed March 23, 2008).

                [34] Ibid.

                [35] Ibid.

                [36] US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1944, Vol. 1,  Committee on Post-War Programs PWC-141b, 5 Aug. 1944, (Washington, DC, 1966), 306-316.

                [37]“Moving the Sudeten Germans: Breakdown in Plans,” The London Times, January 5, 1946, 3e.

                [38]“Settlement in Former German Lands,” The London Times, April 15, 1946, 3d.

                [39]“Transfer of Sudeten Germans: 1,200 for U.S. Zone,” The London Times, January 28, 1946, 3d.

                [40]“Germans Expelled from Poland: Potsdam Agreement not Observed,” The London Times, April 12, 1946, 3d.

                [41] “Czech Transfers of Germans: Conditions Mitigated,” The London Times, January 19, 1946, 4f.

                [42] Joseph E. Evans, “Mass Expulsions: Twelve Million Shunted Into a Smaller Germany From The East Create Vast Social and Economic Problems.” Wall Street Journal (1889-Current file), July 23, 1947, (accessed March 25, 2008).

                [43] “British see Danger of German Hunger,” New York Times, (1857-Current file), February 24, 1946, (accessed March 25, 2008).

                [44] Kathleen McLaughlin, “Allies Asked to Pool Food to Avert Crisis in Germany,” New York Times (1857-Current file), March 1, 1946, (accessed March 25, 2008).

                [45] “Food for Germany Held Basis of Peace,” New York Times, (1857-Current file), June 8, 1946, (accessed March 25, 2008).

                [46] Herbert L. Matthews, “Top Britons Meet on German Crisis: Zone Chiefs Fly to London– Food Plea Sent to Hoover by German in Ruhr,” New York Times, (1857-Current file), May 14, 1947, (accessed March 25, 2008).


            [48] “Huge Relief Supply Sent to Germany,” New York Times (1857-Current file), June 22, 1947, (accessed March 26, 2008).

                [49] Marshall, 659-660.

                [50] Dana Adams Schmidt, “Influx From East Disturbs Germans: Many Resentful of Necessity of Sharing Their Homes with Expelled Persons.” New York Times (1857-Current file), March 9, 1947, (accessed March 26, 2008).

                [51] Joseph E. Evans, “Mass Expulsions: Twelve Million Shunted Into a Smaller Germany From The East Create Vast Social and Economic Problems.” Wall Street Journal (1889-Current file), July 23, 1947, (accessed March 25, 2008).

                [52] Ibid.

                [53] Ibid.

                [54] Drew Middleton, “Grave Problem in West Germany Caused by Refugees From the East: Millions Expelled by Satellite States Unable to Find Work — Political Groups Cool to Admitting Them to Party Rolls,” New York Times (1857-Current file),  April 7, 1949, (accessed March 27, 2008).

                [55] Joseph E. Evans, July 23, 1947, (accessed March 25, 2008).

                [56] Drew Middleton, April 7, 1949, (accessed March 27, 2008).

                [57] Ibid.

                [58] Ibid.

                [59] “German Refugees,” The London Times, February 21, 1949, 5c.

            [60] “A New Force in Germany,” New York Times (1857-Current file), July 11, 1950, (accessed March 27, 2008).

                [61] Ibid.

                [62] Jack Raymond, “Voting Spurs Bonn to Help Refugees: Schleswig-Holstein Election,” New York Times (1857-Current file), July 11, 1950, (accessed March 27, 2008).

                [63] “Measures to Create Work,” The London Times, February 10, 1950, 6c.

                [64] Drew Middleton, “Economic Stress Rises in Western Germany: Despite High Production, Problems of Unemployment and Exports Persist Import-Export Gap High Finance Trade Pact Expected Need for United States Aid,” New York Times (1857-Current file), February 19, 1950, (accessed March 27, 2008).

                [65] David Rock and Stefan Wolff, Coming Home to Germany?, (New York : Berghahn Books, 2002).

                [66]Daniel Levy, “Integrating Ethnic Germans in West Germany: The Early Period,” in Coming Home To Germany?, ed. David Rock and Stefan Wolff (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 27.

                [67] Ibid, 29.

                [68] Paikert, 78-79.

                [69]Ibid, 79.

– Originally written in April 2008

Gale Stokes – The Walls Came Tumbling Down

In Gale Stokes book The Walls Came Tumbling Down, the author examines the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe from 1968 to 1989 with a brief epilogue that explores the transition of these nations from communism to pluralism between 1989 and 1992.  For Stokes, the twentieth century tried three political experiments, the antirational or fascism, the hyperrational or communism, and the pluralism or democracy, and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union represented the triumph of pluralism.  With pluralism’s success in Eastern Europe, Stokes sets out to demonstrate how pluralism overcame hyperrationalsim by focusing on the people and ideas that were the most influential and prominent in antigovernment and dissident organization.  In this context, Stokes reveals how the ideas and individuals constituted a growing civil society within the Eastern Block.  While the majority of the narrative demonstrates the success of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, the author also shows that the collapse of communism can lead to violence by briefly narrating the events in Romania and the deterioration of Yugoslavia.

Stokes begins his narrative with the year 1968 as opposed to 1945 because this earlier period is well documented by historians and because the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia to stamp out the limited liberal reforms permitted by Alexander Dubcek in 1968.  This invasion, which suppressed the Prague Spring, “marked the end of the era when serious people could hope that it would be possible to change the socialist system from within, either economically or politically.” (11) Following 1968, the author narrates the development of opposition groups within several Eastern European nations including the Solidarity trade union in Poland, Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, the New Economic Mechanisms introduced in Hungary, and the Monday demonstrations in the East German city of Leipzig which depict how the opposition slowly whittled away the power of the ruling regime.  However, Stokes also reveals that the communist regimes in place were not out maneuvered in every instance and at times successful at stamping out dissident behavior which is especially evident in Poland where General Jaruzelski’s government suppressed Solidarity throughout the mid-1980s.  Yet, even with their success in maintaining power, these regimes ultimately capitulated giving way to new pluralist governments.

Stokes interpretation of communism’s defeat in Eastern Europe is heavily focused on the ideas and people involved in the antigovernment and dissident movements and how these organizations developed into legitimate oppositions to the communist regimes.  By focusing his narrative on these dissident movements and what he sees as a burgeoning civil society, Stokes overlooks two important features in the collapse of communism.  First, as Stokes acknowledges, communism’s retreat from Eastern Europe is not possible without Mikhail Gorbachev’s relaxation of the Brezhnev Doctrine yet, after introducing Gorbachev and his policies, the Soviet Union plays only a marginal role in Stokes study.  This then suggests that the Soviet Union and Gorbachev played almost no role in communisms collapse whereas in many cases the leaders of the Eastern European communist regimes often appealed to Gorbachev for aid and advice.  By marginalizing Gorbachev, Stokes suggests that his role was not as important as the dissident movements and also ignores the fact that those who held the power in Eastern Europe also played an important role in the demise of communism.

The actions of the leaders of the East European regimes are important as well because, except for Poland where Solidarity encompassed the entire nation, the opposition groups that Stokes examines were small.  As the author states “Charter 77 was never a large movement” but, by focusing on small dissident organizations in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria, the author contends that these movements encompassed much of the population.  (149) This interpretation then appears to mythologize these small dissident organizations and discounts how those that held the levers of power in the communist nations slowly, but eventually, relinquished power to the leaders of dissident movements in peaceful negotiations (except for Romania).  By incorporating how the leaders of the Eastern Europe regimes understood the dissident movements and eventually entered negotiations with them into his narrative, Stokes study would demonstrate that the fall of communism was not a one sided event and present a much broader understanding of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.